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Protecting Privacy in Divorce Actions: Article 8 and the Need 
for Law Reform 
GILLIAN BLACK* 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The role of divorce in society and the allied challenge of law reform in this area constitutes 
one of the most contentious areas of family law and adult relationships.  Whether divorce 
should be a vehicle for upholding the institution of marriage and punishing fault, or a means 
to allow a couple to retreat gracefully from their broken marriage, mark opposite ends of the 
divorce spectrum. Society’s position has shifted along this spectrum over time, yet the two 
ends remain much as they ever were: with conservatives arguing that any liberalisation of 
divorce laws jeopardises the institution of marriage and imperils society; and progressive 
camps contending that divorce law is not there to prevent a marriage from failing, but to 
provide a dignified exit from an already-failed relationship.1 Across Europe, divorce laws 
reflect this range, from those jurisdictions which require fault on the part of one spouse, 
typically through adultery, behaviour, or desertion, to the more consensual “divorce on 
demand” favoured for example in the Scandinavian jurisdictions. The full spectrum, and the 
typical co-mingling of different approaches within any one jurisdiction, has been summarised 
by Antokolskaia: 
These grounds [for divorce] have entered or re-entered the European stage at various 
moments in history and under the influence of various circumstances and ideas, and 
so could be characterised as different generations of divorce law. The fault divorce (in 
other words, divorce as a sanction) came into play during the Protestant Reformation 
under the influence of Reformed theology, while irretrievable breakdown of the 
marriage (in other words, divorce as a remedy of failure) and mutual consent (in other 
words, divorce as an autonomous decision by the spouses themselves) developed on 
the eve of and during the French Revolution under the influence of the Enlightenment, 
and divorce on demand (in other words, divorce as an individual right) appeared after 
                                                          
* Senior Lecturer in Family Law, University of Edinburgh. Thank you to Professor Eric 
Clive, University of Edinburgh and the anonymous reviewer for very helpful feedback on a 
draft of this article, and to colleagues at Cambridge Law School and Glasgow Law School for 
allowing me to present this as a paper during 2017-2018 and their comments and feedback at 
these events.  
1 For an overview of historical and current European trends, see Masha Antokolskaia, 
Harmonisation of Family Law in Europe: A Historical Perspective: A Tale of Two Millennia 
(Intersentia, 2006), ch 14. For a summary of the conservative and liberal debates in divorce 
law, see Jonathan Herring, Rebecca Probert, Stephen Gilmore, Great Debates in Family Law, 
2nd ed (Palgrave, 2015), at 194-203.  
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the Russian Revolution of 1917 as a result of the radical secularisation and de-
ideologisation of marriage. These grounds are products of different epochs, and all are 
simultaneously present in contemporary Europe. Moreover, they all exist in many 
jurisdictions alongside or in combination with one another.2  
 
Scotland is one such jurisdiction. While fault-based grounds remain, they sit alongside the 
more neutral fact of non-cohabitation for a period of time. Moreover, the reality of litigation 
means that scots law has, in effect, divorce on demand, in cases where the spouses are 
prepared to cooperate, for example by not defending the action. While there is a case for 
reform of divorce law on the substantive merits of such reform alone,3 this article seeks to 
make the case that divorce law in Scots law is fundamentally flawed for a very specific 
reason: it breaches the parties’ article 8 ECHR right to privacy. There is thus a strong case for 
law reform to ensure that the statutory basis of divorce provided by the state respects the 
privacy of all parties concerned. In this article, I will advance this argument by outlining the 
basis for divorce at present, and the personal and private information which must be disclosed 
to the state in order to secure a divorce. I will then examine this against the requirements of 
article 8.4 I will conclude by framing briefly a revised divorce law which would facilitate 
divorce without infringing the privacy rights of the spouses or any other parties. 
Before turning to this argument, three critical points must be made. The first is to 
emphasise that the argument I seek to make here, advocating for divorce law reform on the 
grounds of privacy rights under article 8, is distinct from the case for reform (or not) based on 
the substantive merits of fault and no-fault divorce. The campaign for divorce law reform has 
gathered pace in England and Wales in the last two years, prompted by growing concern 
amongst practitioners and the judiciary that the current law promotes antagonism and 
conflict, rather than seeking the most constructive exit from the marriage.5 Academic 
                                                          
2 Masha Antokolskaia, “Divorce Law in a European Perspective”, in Jens M Scherpe (Ed) 
European Family Law Vol III (E Elgar 2016), at 68. 
3 Problems with the continued reliance on fault-based divorce have been set out clearly, albeit 
in the context of English law, by Liz Trinder, Debbie Braybrook, Caroline Bryson, Lester 
Coleman, Catherine Houlston, and Mark Sefton, Finding Fault? Divorce Law and Practice in 
England and Wales, Nuffield Foundation, October 2017 (hereafter “Trinder et al, Finding 
Fault?”). 
4 Data protection will not be considered, as the Data Protection Act 2018 specifically exempts 
certain personal data from the scope of the GDPR where it is processed by a court or tribunal 
acting in its judicial capacity: The Data Protection Act 2018, Schedule 2, Part 2, para 14. 
5 Resolution, the English family lawyers’ association, has been actively campaigning for law 
reform: http://www.resolution.org.uk/editorial.asp?page_id=984&displayMode=preview . 
Comments from Sir James Munby in decided cases and in public lectures have also made the 
case: “Changing families: family law yesterday, today, and tomorrow – a view from south of 
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research has demonstrated convincingly that the time for reform is overdue: Professor Trinder 
and her colleagues published the results of their extensive empirical research into how the 
public use and misuse the English divorce provisions, concerns of the profession, and 
evidence of the damage it causes, in their 2017 paper “Finding Fault? Divorce Law and 
Practice in England and Wales.” And matters arguably came most forcefully to the fore in 
with Owens v Owens,6 wherein Mrs Owens was denied a divorce on the basis that she could 
not meet the statutory test, despite the evidence indicating that her marriage had indeed 
irretrievably broken down. In its July 2018 decision, the Supreme Court described this as a 
troubling case,7 but were powerless to intervene in the face of the statute.8 The Government 
launched a consultation on the reform of divorce law, which closed in December 2018.9 This 
has culminated in the announcement, on 9 April 2019, by the Justice Secretary David Gauke 
that the Government would bring forward legislation for no fault divorce in the next session 
of Parliament.10 There is clearly  much to be said about removing fault from divorce law, and 
I will draw on such evidence where relevant – yet the primary focus of this article will be on 
the privacy rationale for reform.  
Secondly, although disclosure of financial information is often part and parcel of a 
divorce hearing to allow the judge to make an award regarding financial provision, and child 
contact issues may also raise their head, the focus here is exclusively on the mechanics of 
obtaining a divorce, and the personal information required to be disclosed to secure that. 
Financial provision and child contact are secondary issues (albeit often of equal or greater 
concern to the parties), which are not directly relevant to the decree of divorce, and are 
therefore excluded from this analysis. Any information which is required to be disclosed in 
pursuit of financial provision or child contact is separate from the question of what should be 
disclosed to obtain the divorce itself. 
                                                          
the Border” (2018), available at: https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2018/03/speech-pfd-changing-families-edinburgh.pdf at 15. 
6 [2018] UKSC 41. 
7 [2018] UKSC 41, para [46] per Lady Hale. 
8 [2018] UKSC 41, para [45] per Lord Wilson (with whom Lord Hodge and Lady Black 
agreed) and para [46] per Lady Hale. 
9 https://consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-communications/reform-of-the-legal-requirements-for-
divorce/ (accessed 2 April 2019). 
10 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-divorce-law-to-end-the-blame-game (accessed 
9 April 2019). While this is a clear step towards no fault divorce in England and Wales, the 
legislation has not even been introduced to Parliament, let alone debated or enacted. This 
article will therefore refer to the current divorce law in England and Wales where relevant.  
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My third and final preliminary point is to emphasise that the privacy arguments 
advanced here are not intended to encourage a culture of marital secrecy or to require abusive 
and harmful behaviour to stay behind closed doors. For too long, the legal emphasis on 
privacy in family life led to a refusal on the part of the Government to recognise domestic 
abuse, child abuse, or marital rape: respect for family privacy resulted in non-intervention 
and enabled abuse to continue.11 The work done to bring these abuses into the open, to 
recognise them, and to provide legal responses to them, must not be undone. Respecting the 
privacy of the parties by not compelling them to disclose personal and private information 
(about themselves or each other) in the context of divorce is, however, very different from 
failing to respond to such disclosures in the context of abuse. Only this latter should be a 
matter for law. Moreover, the fact that the law currently facilitates disclosure of personal 
information in divorce could in itself be used as a tool for domestic abuse, with threats by one 
spouse to reveal details of an affair or particular behaviour, in order to control or manipulate 
the other spouse. Removing this from private law removes one possibility for coercive 
control.12 
 
B. THE GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE 
There are two grounds for divorce in Scotland: the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, 
and the issue of an interim gender recognition certificate.13 In England, the sole ground of 
divorce at present is that the marriage has broken down irretrievably.14 This article examines 
the irretrievable breakdown of marriage, and the evidence required to prove it. While the 
opening section of the Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976 (“1976 Act”) and the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1973 (“1973 Act”) both state that the ground for divorce is the irretrievable 
breakdown of marriage, this can in fact only be fulfilled by proving that the breakdown has 
resulted from one of four (in Scotland) or five (in England and Wales) specified “sub-
grounds”. There is some confusion over whether these sub-grounds are in fact “grounds” for 
divorce, or whether the only relevant ground (in this context) is the irretrievable breakdown, 
and these listed categories are “facts”. In a recent Scottish Sheriff Court decision, Sheriff 
Mann classed the sub-categories as “grounds”, with reference to wording in the Scottish 
                                                          
11 For example, Elizabeth Schneider’s analysis of “the dark and violent side of privacy” in 
“The Violence of Privacy” (1991) 23 Conn. Law Rev. 973. 
12 As most recently legislated for in the Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018. 
13 Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976, s1(1)(a) and (b).  
14 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s1(1). Where an interim gender recognition certificate is 
issued, the marriage is voidable in terms of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s12(1)(g). 
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legislation. Having referred to the phrasing of section 12 of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 
2006, which stated that desertion was no longer to be a ground, he concluded: “That is a clear 
indication that the legislature considered desertion to be a separate ground upon which 
irretrievable breakdown of marriage could be established. If desertion was a separate ground 
then so too were, and are, adultery, unreasonable behaviour and the periods of non-
cohabitation.”15  In contrast, the English legislation refers to the five “facts” by which 
irretrievable breakdown can be established. The terminology adopted in this article will 
reflect these positions, referring to any of the four or five bases for establishing irretrievable 
breakdown being referred to as “grounds” or “facts”. Thus, in Scotland, the four grounds for 
irretrievable breakdown set out in the 1976 Act are: 
1(2) The irretrievable breakdown of a marriage shall, subject to the following 
provisions of this Act, be taken to be established in an action for divorce if— 
(a) since the date of the marriage the defender has committed adultery; or 
(b) since the date of the marriage the defender has at any time behaved 
(whether or not as a result of mental abnormality and whether such behaviour 
has been active or passive) in such a way that the pursuer cannot reasonably be 
expected to cohabit with the defender; or 
(c). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [desertion – now repealed] 
(d) there has been no cohabitation between the parties at any time during a 
continuous period of one year after the date of the marriage and immediately 
preceding the bringing of the action and the defender consents to the granting 
of decree of divorce; or 
(e) there has been no cohabitation between the parties at any time during a 
continuous period of two years after the date of the marriage and immediately 
preceding the bringing of the action. 
 
In England and Wales, the five facts are: 
1(2) The court hearing a petition for divorce shall not hold the marriage to have 
broken down irretrievably unless the petitioner satisfies the court of one or more of 
the following facts, that is to say— 
(a) that the respondent has committed adultery and the petitioner finds it 
intolerable to live with the respondent; 
(b) that the respondent has behaved in such a way that the petitioner cannot 
reasonably be expected to live with the respondent; 
(c) that the respondent has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of at 
least two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition; 
(d) that the parties to the marriage have lived apart for a continuous period of 
at least two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition 
(hereafter in this Act referred to as “two years’ separation”) and the 
respondent consents to a decree being granted; 
                                                          
15 Ray v Ray [2017] SC BAN 60 at [8]; see also [7]. 
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(e) that the parties to the marriage have lived apart for a continuous period of 
at least five years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition 
(hereafter in this Act referred to as “five years’ separation”). 
 
The critical difference16 between jurisdictions is in relation to the non-cohabitation grounds. 
In Scotland, the 1976 Act was revised in 2006, to reduce the periods of non-cohabitation 
from 2 years to 1 year with consent, and from 5 years to 2 years without.17  
One interesting point of contrast between the jurisdictions is the use made by couples 
of these different bases for divorce. The figures for Scotland for 2015-16 and those from 
England and Wales from 2017 show a clear divergence in approach:18 
 
 England & 
Wales: 
2017 
 Scotland: 
2015-16 
 
Adultery 10,611 10.44% 32 0.36% 
Behaviour 47,135 46.36% 417 4.7% 
Desertion 472 0.46% n/a n/a 
Shorter Non-
cohabitation + 
consent (2 
years/ 1 year) 
27,012 26.57% 2287 25.77% 
                                                          
16 A minor difference exists in relation to adultery, whereby in Scotland, only the bare fact of 
adultery need be established, whereas in England and Wales, the petitioner must also 
demonstrate that it is intolerable to live with the respondent. The practical impact of this is 
limited.  
17 Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, s11. One obvious consequence was that the ground of 
desertion was repealed (s12), as being no longer relevant given the new timeframes. 
18 Figures taken from “Divorces and Dissolutions”, National Records for Scotland available 
at: https://www.gov.scot/publications/civil-justice-statistics-scotland-2017-18/ . Scottish 
statistics for 2016-18 and 2017-18 are limited to indicating whether the divorce was granted 
using the simplified procedure or not. In 2017-18 61% of the 6,873 divorces were granted 
using the simplified procedure, which indicates that these at least were based on one of the 
periods of non-cohabitation and there were no children under 16. There were presumably 
other divorces granted in this period based on non-cohabitation, where there were children 
under 16. (Interestingly, the total number of divorces in 2017-2018 shows a marked decrease 
from the 2016-2017 figure of 7,938.) The statistics for England and Wales are published at 
“Divorces for England and Wales 2017”, the Office for National Statistics for England and 
Wales, available at: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/divorce/b
ulletins/divorcesinenglandandwales/2017 .  
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Longer Non-
cohabitation, 
no consent (5 
years/ 2years) 
15,619 15.36% 6068 68.37% 
Total 101,669  8,974  
 
 
As these statistics seem to show, the shorter periods of non-cohabitation in Scotland have 
proved attractive to divorcing couples, allowing 94% of them to finalise their divorces in one 
or two years, based solely on non-cohabitation. The longer periods required south of the 
border appear to have resulted in more couples using adultery or behaviour, in order to exit 
the marriage in much shorter timeframes, and certainly long before the five year non-
cohabitation (without consent) option is available. Adultery and behaviour are thus more 
relevant in England and Wales than in Scotland: as the most recent figures show, 56.8% of 
couples in England and Wales rely on adultery or behaviour to found their divorce, compared 
with just 5.1% in Scotland. 
As Trinder et al observe in Finding Fault?, however, this difference in choice of 
ground or fact cannot be explained solely by the shorter timescales – and there is nothing to 
suggest that it arises from different marital habits concerning adultery and behaviour in 
Scotland.19  Instead, as she argues, the different procedural incentives in Scotland, such as the 
Simplified Procedure, coupled with the availability of aliment and a different structure of 
financial provision,20 all unite to mean couples in Scotland are often not under such time 
pressures or financial need to finalise the divorce as quickly as possible. Taking one or two 
years to negotiate financial provision (and child contact, where relevant) is fairly standard, 
and consequently allows couples to rely on the non-cohabitation grounds for divorce while 
suffering no particular inconvenience. This approach gains support from looking at the 
                                                          
19 Trinder et al, Finding Fault?, para 11.3. 
20 Itself the subject of debate between jurisdictions, as to whether the Scottish system 
provides much-needed certainty and a clean-break or is too rigid, and whether the English 
system provides much needed-flexibility, or is a permanent drain on one party, while 
providing a “meal ticket for life” for the other. See for example “Family Matters: ‘Meal ticket 
for life’ divorce deals must be stopped, urge law chiefs”, Frances Gibb, Legal Editor, The 
Times, 20 November 2017. 
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Scottish statistics from 2002, prior to the divorce law reform of 2006.21 These show that even 
when longer periods of non-cohabitation were required, Scots couples still tended to rely 
more heavily on these grounds: whereas 19.25% of divorces were granted for adultery or 
behaviour, 56.18% were founded on two years’ non-cohabitation with consent, and 24% on 
five years’ non-cohabitation without consent.22 
Moreover, something even more interesting emerges from the Scottish statistics, 
which is the very clear preference for the two years’ non-cohabitation ground (68.4%), over 
the one year with consent option (25.8%). This indicates that not only will couples opt to 
avoid the more contentious fault-finding grounds of adultery and behaviour (accounting for 
only 5.1% of Scottish divorces), but also that the pursuer will, where possible, opt for the 
ground which gives maximum control and requires minimum input from the other spouse. 
Rather than exiting as quickly as possible, after one year of non-cohabitation, and thereby 
requiring the consent and cooperation of the spouse, pursuers seem to prefer the two years’ 
non-cohabitation ground which does not require consent. It seems likely that waiting two 
years does not in fact add very much to the length of process for most couples: the time taken 
to negotiate and agree financial provision and child contact will often take couples well over 
a year: by which time, the action for divorce can be amended from one of 
adultery/behaviour/one year’s non-cohabitation, to the most straightforward two-years’ non-
cohabitation route.23 Yet this route, which minimises finger-pointing and blame and the need 
for any cooperation, is used only by the most patient spouses in England and Wales, where 
only 15.36% of couples use the five years’ non-cohabitation without consent fact. 
                                                          
21 These were the latest available statistics provided, prior to 2006: 
https://www2.gov.scot/Publications/2004/02/18897/33085 (accessed 24 January 2019). 
22 The figures are: 10,826 divorces, with 428 (3.95%) on adultery; 1656 (15.3%) on 
behaviour; 42 (0.39%) on desertion; 6082 (56.18%) on non-cohabitation with consent; and 
2598 (24%) on non-cohabitation without consent. 
23 Evidence from reported cases shows that a minute of amendment may often be lodged, 
seeking to delete the original crave (on grounds of adultery or behaviour) and substitute 
therefor a crave based on non-cohabitation. This indicates that at the time of raising the 
action, such a plea will not usually be available as a result of insufficient time having passed 
– but that, by the time the action is heard (usually following extensive negotiation regarding 
financial provision), the parties have been separated for the requisite period, and can 
therefore move to proceed on a less contentious basis. There has been judicial debate about 
the correctness of this approach: see, on the one hand Sheriff Mann in Ray v Ray [2017] SC 
BAN 60 (following Lord Murray in Duncan v Duncan 1986 SLT 17) and, on the other, 
Sheriff Collins in McNulty v McNulty 2016 Fam LR 145 and again in Douglas v Douglas 
[2019] SC PER 4. See also Jane Mair, “Divorce Law in Scotland: Not Entirely without Fault: 
LV v IV, X v Y, and Douglas v Douglas” (2019) 23(2) Edinburgh Law Review 236. 
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Antokolskaia has noted that “Empirical data suggest that spouses, assisted by their lawyers, 
are always able to choose the shortest route to divorce, just as water will always find its way 
to the lowest point”.24 However, timescales are only part of the picture: where there is no 
significant additional social cost, in terms of time, divorcing couples in Scotland seek the 
smoothest route, with greater control and certainty, and less fault. 
The importance of being able to rely on a ground, or fact, which leaves control in the 
hands of the party seeking the divorce, is also reflected in the English experience. Adultery 
and two years’ non-cohabitation both carry the need for the other spouse to cooperate, by 
admitting or consenting.25 The behaviour fact has therefore been by far the most popular in 
England and Wales (used by over 46% of couples in 2017), not least because it removes the 
need for any admission of fault, or consent.26  The only other ground which does this is the 
five years’ non-cohabitation ground, which involves a very lengthy delay before the parties 
are free to move one. With behaviour, however, there is no need for any minimum period or 
for any positive contribution from the other spouse: the defendant needs to agree to the 
action, but can do so even while rebutting the facts stated in the petition.27 While the 
extensive downsides of the fault ground are made clear in Finding Fault?, it does at least 
enable one party to petition without active cooperation from the other. 
Factors which can influence the choice of ground or fact include the timescales 
involved, plus the need for consent or cooperation from the other spouse. Yet regardless of 
which ground/fact is used, the pursuer/petitioner will need to disclose personal information in 
order to demonstrate the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. 
 
 
C. PROVING IRRETRIEVABLE BREAKDOWN OF MARRIAGE 
(1) The need for evidence 
A spouse wishing to raise an action or petition for decree of divorce must consider what 
evidence is required to prove one of the four or five bases of irretrievable breakdown. In 
England and Wales, an undefended divorce (on any of the five facts) can be sought by 
                                                          
24 Masha Antokolskaia, “Divorce law in a European Perspective”, in Jens M Scherpe (Ed) 
European Family Law Vol III (E Elgar 2016), at 72. 
25 Trinder et al, Finding Fault?, 44 (para 3.6). 
26 Except in rare cases (such as Owens v Owens) where it is defended: Trinder et al, Finding 
Fault?, 44 (para 3.6). 
27 Trinder et al, Finding Fault?, 47, quoting evidence from an interviewee who adopted this 
approach; and 121 (“Options available to respondents”).  
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completing the appropriate form and submitting it to court. The petition will be reviewed by a 
judge (or legally qualified assistant, where this is delegated).28 The 1973 Act specifically 
enjoins the court to seek evidence: “On a petition for divorce it shall be the duty of the court 
to inquire, so far as it reasonably can, into the facts alleged by the petitioner and into any 
facts alleged by the respondent.”29 Research has shown, however, that Regional Divorce 
Centres do not usually require corroborating evidence: in 2015, no RDCs required 
evidence.30 
In Scots law, it is possible for the parties to use the Simplified/Do it Yourself 
Procedure where (i) there are no children under 16 and (ii) the divorce is sought on the basis 
of non-cohabitation (whether for one or two years). The Simplified Procedure is a “cheap and 
simple method”,31 which does not require the involvement of a solicitor. Either party can 
download and complete the appropriate form and affidavit and lodge them, together with the 
marriage certificate (and fee), at the relevant Sheriff Court. In all other cases, for example 
because of the ground relied upon (ie adultery or behaviour) or because the action is 
defended, the parties will be required to raise an action and bring evidence of the basis on 
which their marriage has irretrievably broken down. In terms of s1(6) of the 1976 Act, this 
must be established on the balance of probability. The pursuer will require to submit an 
affidavit on his/her own behalf together with one from a corroborating witness. The solicitor 
acting should ensure there is adequate evidence to put before the court. If the action is 
defended, the pursuer and witness will usually require to give evidence in court, which will of 
course be subject to the rigours of cross-examination. Where the action proceeds undefended, 
the pursuer’s solicitor must lodge the affidavits with the court, and affirm that the evidence 
establishes that the marriage has irretrievably broken down. Thus, an external party (either 
the judge or the solicitor) will require to see and weigh sufficient evidence that the marriage 
has irretrievably broken down, on the basis of adultery, behaviour, or non-cohabitation. 
                                                          
28 For an account of the divorce process in England and Wales, and the use of legally 
qualified Assistant Justices’ Clerks to process undefended decree nisi applications, see 
Trinder et al, Finding Fault?, Ch 4 “The court’s inquiries: just administrative rubber 
stamping?” 
29 1973 Act, section 1(3). Sir James Munby has, however, noted that the duty on the court is 
“qualified by the crucial words ‘so far as it reasonably can’”: Owens v Owens [2017] EWCA 
Civ 182, para 93. See further Trinder et al, Finding Fault?, Ch 4. 
30 Trinder et al, Finding Fault?, 76. 
31 Scottish Courts and Tribunals Service, “A Guide to the Simplified Divorce/ Dissolution of 
Civil Partnership Procedure in Scotland”, December 2014, p1. (Available at: 
https://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/rules-and-practice/guidance-notes/simplified-divorce-and-
dissolution-of-civil-partnership-guidance-notes - accessed 2 April 2019.)  
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What evidence will be required to demonstrate the irretrievable breakdown? The 
exact material will depend on the specific ground pled although inevitably it will be personal 
and private information. Each of the four grounds will be examined in turn: since desertion 
does not exist in Scots law and is used in less than 1% of cases in England and Wales, it will 
not be included in this assessment. 
 
(2) Adultery 
In cases of adultery, there must be proof that the defender had sexual intercourse with 
someone of the opposite sex32 – or at least, evidence of the inclination and opportunity to do 
so.33 If no direct evidence is available to corroborate the pursuer’s claim, then recourse may 
be had to a private investigator, to follow the defender and produce photographs and a 
statement that the defender had the opportunity to commit adultery. Other evidence may 
come from electronic evidence, such as photos or videos of the act. These may be 
supplemented by additional evidence, such as emails, texts, other photos, or diary entries.34 
All such evidence will constitute highly personal and intimate information relating to the 
defender and to the paramour. There may also be very private information concerning the 
pursuer, to substantiate the claim, such as that the pursuer contracted an STI as a result of the 
spouse’s affair. The evidence may also involve children, for example where one spouse 
brings evidence that the child was conceived as a result of the affair. 
 
(3) Behaviour 
Where the ground pled is behaviour, this will necessitate the disclosure of conduct by the 
defender which has been intolerable to the pursuer. While this will often focus primarily on 
the defender’s behaviour, the full statutory test involves a subjective element: that is, the 
behaviour is such that this spouse cannot reasonably be expected to cohabit with the 
defender. If the pursuer has some specific character trait which renders him/her more 
vulnerable, this will be relevant – perhaps a health condition or very difficult personal 
                                                          
32 Eric Clive, The Law of Husband and Wife in Scotland, SULI (4th ed, 1997), paras 21.004 
and 21.007. Any other sexual activity, not amounting to sexual intercourse, is not adultery, 
but may well meet the second base of irretrievable breakdown, behaviour, as too would 
sexual intercourse with someone of the same sex. 
33 Eric Clive, The Law of Husband and Wife in Scotland, SULI (4th ed, 1997), para 23.032; 
Jonathan Herring, Family Law, 8th ed (Pearson, 2017), at 146. 
34 The admissibility of such evidence is a separate issue. If admissible, it may nevertheless be 
an invasion of privacy. 
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circumstances. Again, we see that the evidence required will impact on both parties to the 
marriage: establishing the behaviour of one, and the impact it has had on the other. And 
again, this may well involve other parties, including children who have suffered from the 
conduct, or someone with whom the defender has had a liaison, albeit one which fell short of 
adultery. The evidence may often include medical details, as to the physical or mental health 
of one or both parties, either as the cause of the behaviour in question (which is not a 
defence35) or as a reason for why this particular spouse cannot tolerate the behaviour. 
Reported cases demonstrate a wide range of conduct which has satisfied this test, including 
physical assaults; threatened physical assaults; sexual behaviour; neglectful behaviour; 
obsessive behaviour; drunkenness or drug abuse; or exposure to risk of disease.36  
Although there is no empirical evidence of a similar trend in Scotland, the clear 
evidence in England and Wales is that the type of conduct required (in undefended actions at 
least) is considerably lower than most parties initially presume, and certainly no longer 
requires physical assault.37As the Finding Fault? report concludes, the evidence is that the 
behaviour fact in England and Wales in undefended petitions can be established on the basis 
of anodyne and largely generalised allegations, so long as there is at least something 
attributed to the fault of the defendant.38 While this may not require the disclosure of deeply 
personal information, petitioners are nonetheless required to make statements attributing fault 
in relation to the personal behaviour and conduct of their spouse and include a statement 
about the effect this has had on them (for example that they felt “greatly saddened” or 
“serious distress”39). Trinder’s research also demonstrates that even if the lawyers and judges 
preparing and scrutinising these petitions view them very much as a “means to an end”, the 
individual parties involved will often (understandably) take them personally:40 a statement 
which might seem relatively anodyne to the profession may still touch on a distressing private 
and personal matter to one or both parties.41    
                                                          
35 1976 Act, s1(2)(b) states “whether or not as a result of mental abnormality”. 
36 For an account of these, see Eric Clive, The Law of Husband and Wife in Scotland (4th ed, 
SULI, 1997), paras 21.024 – 21.034; and Jonathan Herring, Family Law, 8th ed (Pearson, 
2017), at 146-148; Trinder et al, Finding Fault?, 73-76. 
37 Trinder et al, Finding Fault?, Ch 5 “Finding the floor; what is a ‘Fact’ in practice?” 
38 Trinder et al, Finding Fault?, 45-47 (para 3.6). 
39 Trinder et al, Finding Fault?, 79, examples from interviews.  
40 Trinder et al, Finding Fault?, 119-121 (“Being on the receiving end”). 
41 Trinder et al, Finding Fault?, 115-116. While accepting that the facts pled in a fault 
petition were a means to an end, and not inherently “personal” one lawyer stated: “When 
you’ve got it in black and white in a court document it rings a bit hollow” [ie about it being a 
process/ means to an end].  
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(4) Non-cohabitation 
Divorce actions brought on the grounds of non-cohabitation appear at first sight to require far 
less personal or intrusive evidence: all that is required is evidence that the couple stopped 
cohabiting on a certain date. This could be evidenced by the date of a new lease in one 
party’s name, for example. Yet cohabitation is not a spatial concept, so it is possible for a 
couple to no longer be cohabiting, even where they still live under the same roof.42 For 
financial reasons, such a situation is often inevitable, at least in the short term. Once again, 
we can see that there is scope for very invasive and personal information to be used to 
substantiate the claim, especially when the couple are still sharing a house. In that case, the 
court will require evidence that they were no longer living together as husband and wife. The 
everyday minutiae of their lives, from the mundane to the intimate, will become relevant to 
the court, to establish the date on which they stopped cohabiting.43 Scrutiny may extend to 
details of their finances, food shopping, cooking, cleaning, washing, and, of course, sex – or 
its absence. While presenting evidence in public of a sexual relationship is clearly intrusive, it 
is contended that evidence of the lack of a sexual relationship can be equally intrusive. Given 
that the norm in society is for a married couple to have marital relations, the public disclosure 
that sex has been absent from their lives, possibly for an extended period, has the potential to 
be just as invasive and distressing for them.44 
 
(5) Questioning the disclosure of private information in divorce actions 
Two initial concerns can be raised about the merits of requiring this sort of private 
information to be disclosed, whether to prove adultery, behaviour or non-cohabitation. In the 
first place, the need to establish the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage through reliance 
on evidence is arguably somewhat self-defeating. Either the judicial scrutiny establishes that 
the case is made out, and decree is therefore granted, or that there is insufficient evidence of 
adultery, behaviour, or non-cohabitation, such that the initial action was unmerited. In the 
latter case, it is at least arguable that the action of the pursuer in raising the unmerited action 
                                                          
42 Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976, section 13(2). 
43 In England and Wales, the case of Mouncer v Mouncer [1972] 1 All ER 290 requires the 
parties to be living strictly separated lives under the same roof – although there is evidence 
that such rigid separation would not be insisted upon today. See Trinder et al, Finding Fault?, 
48-49. 
44 The parties themselves may be more than happy with this state of affairs: what is being 
challenged here is the public disclosure of it, in divorce proceedings. 
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in the first place – and possibly lying to the court – then justifies a new action by the former 
defender, now pursuer, on behaviour grounds, such that he/she cannot reasonably be expected 
to continue to cohabit. The judicial examination of the most personal details of the couple's 
private lives is thus arguably pointless; either the facts are proved and decree granted, or they 
are not proved, thus giving rise to a second and, almost by definition, valid ground for 
divorce (should the defender/respondent choose to avail themselves of it). 
Further, Finding Fault? makes it clear that the reasons stated in the petition need not 
be an accurate reflection of the reason(s) that the marriage has broken down.45 Thus, one 
spouse’s adultery might have been the catalyst for the irretrievable breakdown of the 
marriage, but the divorce petition might be framed in terms of the behaviour of the other 
spouse.46 While this practice in England and Wales does allow the parties to keep certain 
information private if they wish, it does indicate that (i) the literal truth is not important to the 
state when granting divorces and (ii) the information which is presented is not really relevant: 
any (truthful) information would suffice, albeit that information will be recorded for all time 
coming in a court document. Both these points are important when we consider in part D 
below whether such disclosure is required at all for the purposes of granting a divorce. 
These raise important concerns in their own right: the damage done to an already 
fractured relationship has been long-recognised, caused by “the humiliating accusational 
procedure [which] increased aversion and bitterness between the spouses and made their 
intimate life the subject of public scrutiny.”47 Yet leaving aside the question of whether it is 
helpful to require such disclosure in any of these situations, and whether it in any way 
contributes positively to the marital relationship and its termination, we can ask whether such 
disclosure breaches article 8. This requires an analysis of (i) whether it is private information; 
and (ii) if so, whether its disclosure is justified. 
 
D. ARTICLE 8: PRIVACY CONSIDERATIONS 
                                                          
45 Trinder et al, Finding Fault?, 41-42 (para 3.5) regarding “pragmatic approaches” to Fact 
selection.  
46 Trinder et al, Finding Fault?, 48, quoting from an interviewee in this position. 
47 M Antokolskaia, Harmonisation of Family Law in Europe: A Historical Perspective: A 
Tale of Two Millennia (Intersentia, 2006), p314. Evidence from Finding Fault? suggests that 
making personal allegations of fault against one spouse can be highly counter-productive in 
terms of the parties’ longer-term relationship, not least re child care and finances: Trinder et 
al, Finding Fault?, Ch 7 “Fanning the flames: does fault increase conflict?”. There was also 
evidence of fear of recrimination: 50; 53-54. 
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Article 8 ECHR, long known to family lawyers for protecting and advancing family 
relationships in all shapes and sizes, according to function rather than form, has also played a 
critical role in the sphere of privacy. Since 2000, the English courts have recognised a tort of 
misuse of private information, arising from the Human Rights Act 1998 and the need to 
respect article 8 in domestic courts. This requires three elements: whether there is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the information; whether it is disclosed in accordance 
with law; and whether its disclosure in necessary in a democratic society. Of these, the third 
element is the one which is of greatest concern here. The first two can be dealt with briefly, 
as follows. 
 
(1) A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
Personal information will only benefit from protection under article 8 where there is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to it. Relevant factors in determining this are: 
1. The nature of the information;48 
2. The nature of the relationship between the parties;49 
3. The way in which the information is proposed to be disclosed;50 
4. Whether any of the information includes photographs – with photographs tending to 
attract a higher degree of protection than written information;51 
5. Where the private act took place – even something taking place in public can have an 
expectation of privacy, in some cases, if the proposed dissemination is far wider than 
the party would have foreseen;52 
6. Whether the information is already in the public domain to any extent;53 
7. Whether the information concerns children, who enjoy a higher expectation of 
privacy.54 
                                                          
48 The sensitivity and intimacy of the information are relevant to the balancing process: Helen 
Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson, Media Freedom, at 779.  
49 Of course, there may also be a duty of confidence between the parties, in which case the 
doctrine of breach of confidence will also come into play, as per McKennitt v Ash [2008] QB 
73. 
50 Disclosure in the media is likely to attract less protection than disclosure to the courts, for 
example. 
51 Campbell v MGN [2004] UKHL 22. 
52 Peck v The United Kingdom (App No 44647/98) 28 January 2003, (2003) 35 EHRR 41; 
Von Hannover (App No 59320) 24 June 2004; (2005) 40 EHRR 1. 
53 Mosley v News Group Newspapers [2008] EWHC 687 (QB); cf Douglas v Hello! [2007] 
UKHL 21, and in the High Court [2003] EWHC (Ch) 786. 
54 Murray v Big Pictures UK Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 446. 
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It is clear that the type of information disclosed in divorce actions is frequently private 
information, concerning intimate details of the parties’ lives, including sexual relationships 
and physical and mental health. Sexual relations in particular have been the subject of much 
litigation in this area, and as Nicol J has observed: “[s]exual behaviour in private is part of the 
core aspects of individual autonomy which Article 8 is intended to protect”.55  This of course 
applies to sexual behaviour between married persons and also to extra-marital affairs: this 
strikes at the heart of much of the evidence required to establish the irretrievable breakdown 
of marriage. Whether the action or petition is raised based on adultery, behaviour, or non-
cohabitation, sex – or the absence of sex – is highly likely to play a part in establishing the 
breakdown. Given the nature of the evidence, examined above, it seems clear that there will 
usually be a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to it, especially where part of the 
information comprises photographs, or information concerning children.  
If one party has chosen to disclose the information more widely, for example through 
social media, then it may lose the necessary quality of privacy. English cases such as 
McKennitt v Ash56 have however held that information may still maintain its quality as 
“private” even if it concerns one of the parties. Thus, there can be a reasonable expectation of 
privacy even where a party is seeking to disclose information which relates to him/herself, if 
it also concerns other parties. The classic situation (although not the one in McKennitt v Ash), 
is where the would-be discloser has had an affair with a celebrity, and now wishes to sell the 
story to a tabloid. Even though the discloser is seeking to telling his/her own story in the “kiss 
and tell”, it can amount to an invasion of the privacy of the other party, as per Ferdinand v 
MGN57 and indeed third parties, such as spouses or children. It may be thought that there can 
be no reasonable expectation of privacy in information that one party had an affair, but the 
High Court has held that this can be protected in some circumstances at least:  
there can be no rule of "generality" that an adulterer can never obtain an injunction to 
restrain the publication of matters relating to his adulterous relationship; or, to put it 
another way, even an adulterous relationship may attract, at least in certain respects, a 
legitimate expectation of privacy.58  
                                                          
55 Ferdinand v MGN Ltd [2011] EWHC 2454 (QB). 
56 McKennitt v Ash [2008] QB 73 
57 Ferdinand v MGN Ltd [2011] EWHC 2454 (QB). See also Gillian Black, “Privacy 
considered and jurisprudence consolidated: Ferdinand v MGN Ltd” (2012) EIPR 64.  
58 CC v AB [2006] EWHC 3083 (QB) at 30.  
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Only where there is some other factor justifying disclosure could information regarding an 
affair be legitimately published (or potentially disclosed at all) – an example being the need 
to correct lies or “set the record straight”.59 
While information can lose the necessary quality of privacy if it is disclosed more 
widely, nevertheless, individuals can be prevented from disclosing information about 
themselves, where it would also involve disclosing private information concerning another 
party. Moreover, the mere fact of adultery will not strip the information of that quality, 
without more, such as the need to correct lies. Most of the details required to be disclosed to 
establish one of the bases of irretrievable breakdown are therefore likely to be subject to a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. Any third parties involved, typically children or a 
paramour, may well have a reasonable expectation of privacy, even if the other spouse does 
not. 
So, the first element is whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, as regards 
the private information – and it seems likely that information regarding a person’s marriage, 
health, sexual conduct, and finances would typically constitute information in which there is 
a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
 
(2) In Accordance with Law 
The second element of article 8 requires that any disclosure be made in accordance with law. 
Where the disclosure is to the state, represented by the courts, in terms of the 1976 Act or the 
1973 Act, then it will certainly be in accordance with law.60 
 
(3) Necessary in a Democratic Society 
Where the debate arises is whether it is necessary in a democratic society to legislate for this 
disclosure. This is where a careful examination of divorce law is required: is disclosure of 
adultery, behaviour, or non-cohabitation necessary for the state to grant a divorce?  
There is plenty of evidence from jurisdictions across Europe that divorce can be 
facilitated without the need for any such inquiry by the state, or any presentation of evidence 
                                                          
59 Discussed in the context of drug abuse in Campbell v MGN [2004] UKHL 22; and re 
infidelity in Ferdinand v MGN Ltd [2011] EWHC 2454 (QB). 
60 Disclosure more widely, for example in the media or on social media, will not be in 
accordance with the relevant divorce legislation, although may otherwise be in accordance 
with law, but that is a separate issue. 
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of the personal lives of spouses.61 By providing for divorce by mutual consent or divorce on 
demand, states can remove the need for any enquiry into, or evidence of, the condition of the 
marriage or the personal and private lives involved.62 Thus, Spain, Sweden and Finland, for 
example, have exclusively consent or demand systems, with no opportunity for either spouse 
to raise fault grounds – as does Ireland, albeit with a prior requirement for an extensive 
period of four years’ separation.63 France, Norway and Denmark have systems which are 
primarily based on consent or demand, but which do recognise fault based grounds in 
exceptional circumstances, such as attempted murder of the spouse or children, forced 
marriage, or domestic violence. Germany also relies primarily on consent or demand, 
following periods of separation (one year with consent or three years without), but with the 
addition of the right to dissolve the marriage with less than one year’s separation “if the 
continuation of the marriage would be an unreasonable hardship for the petitioner for reasons 
that lie in the person of the other spouse.”64 It is abundantly clear from practice across Europe 
that, while fault-based grounds may exist, there is no necessary requirement for state-
sanctioned disclosure of private information in order to obtain a divorce.  
There must therefore be a cogent reason why the state demands such disclosure. On 
what basis is such disclosure “in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection 
of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”? Only where 
the disclosure meets this test of “necessary in a democratic society” will it fall outwith the 
scope of protection under article 8. Of these grounds, the protection of health or morals or of 
the rights and freedoms of others seem the most likely upon which to justify any invasion of 
privacy. There may thus be policy arguments in favour of the current divorce law, with its 
state-mandated disclosure of private information, based on religious or cultural or 
philosophical beliefs.  
One such argument, looking to both the protection of morals and the rights and 
freedoms of others, is that the existing law is justified in order to uphold the sanctity of 
                                                          
61 Country information taken from the Commission on European Family Law reports at 
http://ceflonline.net/divorce-maintenance-reports-by-jurisdiction/ ; Trinder et al, Finding 
Fault?, 152-154; and Masha Antokolskaia, “Divorce law in a European Perspective”, in Jens 
M Scherpe (Ed) European Family Law Vol III (E Elgar, 2016). 
62 Divorce and Maintenance Reports by Jurisdiction, Commission on European Family Law, 
at http://ceflonline.net/divorce-maintenance-reports-by-jurisdiction/.  
63 Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996, section 5.  
64 BGB, Sections 1564-1567. 
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marriage. This argument is predicated on the idea that maintaining the state-mandated 
disclosure of private information (and, typically, an element of fault divorce) achieves one or 
both of two things: (i) it makes divorce harder, which deters people from seeking a divorce, 
thus promoting marriage: the couple may choose to stay married rather than going through 
divorce and disclosure; (ii) it emphasises that one person is to blame for the marriage failing, 
and that person should take responsibility, or be punished, for the divorce. 
In the first place, any argument based on protecting the rights and freedoms of the 
other spouse carries no weight when both spouses wish to divorce: in such a case, any 
obstacles to divorce interfere with the rights and freedoms of both. Secondly, the idea that 
making divorce harder upholds the sanctity of marriage has been convincingly challenged. 
Restrictive divorce laws do not save a failed marriage: it has long been recognised that 
“preventing a divorce was not the same as preventing a marriage from breaking down.”65 
Making the exit route harder may deter some couples from divorcing, but whether such 
couples thereafter enjoy a meaningful and fulfilling marriage is open to question. Consigning 
unhappy couples to remain trapped in a loveless marriage hardly seems to uphold the sanctity 
of marriage, or to respect their health and morals or rights and freedoms.    
Finding Fault? also demonstrates the fallacy of equating harder divorce with 
upholding marriage, by showing that the current divorce law has little, if any impact, on 
promoting marriage: “It is likely that the grounds for divorce may influence the timings of the 
divorce proceedings, but it would appear to overstate the influence of the law in people’s 
lives to suggest that the law might influence whether the personal relationship does or does 
not break down.”66 The legal mechanism for divorce is highly unlikely to operate to protect 
the “innocent” spouse from the breakdown of the relationship, however much it might control 
the legal exit routes from that relationship. Moreover, as also illustrated in Finding Fault?, 
the state in England and Wales at least does not require disclosure of the literal truth of the 
breakdown. This supports, rather than undermines, the call to move to a system of divorce 
which does not require intrusive inquiry into the spouses’ personal lives and private 
information. As Trinder et al observe: “if the petition is not a broadly accurate reflection of 
the reasons for the marriage breakdown, it is open to question what purpose fault is serving 
and what value the parties or the state accrue from what can be the ritualistic production of 
                                                          
65 Jonathan Herring, Rebecca Probert, Stephen Gilmore, Great Debates in Family Law, 2nd ed 
(Palgrave, 2015), 195. 
66 Trinder et al, Finding Fault?, 129, and Ch 9 “Does fault protect the institution of marriage/ 
deter divorce?”. 
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particulars.”67 Although the state supposedly requires this information in order to grant the 
divorce, the rationale for requiring it is not supported by the practice, which sees a 
discrepancy between the reasons for the breakdown and the private information disclosed.  
The second leg of this argument is also flawed, as it assumes that there will always be 
one party at fault. Yet in many cases, both parties will typically be partly to blame for the 
gradual breakdown of the relationship.68 Moreover, as was shown above, the idea of 
ascribing blame is no longer reflected in the measures regarding financial provision or child 
care (contrary to the previous position): we have, deliberately, moved away from such a 
counter-productive approach. And of course, even if current divorce laws do attempt to 
“punish” one spouse, in part by requiring the disclosure of their faults and/or their private 
information in court, the foregoing analysis has demonstrated that in most cases, the innocent 
spouse will also be required to disclose highly personal information about themselves or 
children of the marriage – thereby punishing both spouses.  
A further argument could be that the rights and freedoms of children of the marriage 
require a strict divorce law: would a divorce law that is too “easy” interfere with the family 
lives of children? There are a number of responses to this – not least to recognise that such an 
argument only holds where there are children of the marriage. Moreover, seeking to protect 
the rights and freedoms of the child to a family life has to be balanced against the rights and 
freedoms of the adults to exit a failed relationship. We should also question whether it is 
better for a child to be caught in the acrimony of their parents’ unhappy marriage or bitter 
divorce. In introducing the proposals for a reformed divorce law in England and Wales, the 
Justice Secretary specifically referred to the damage the current law can inflict on children: 
“Hostility and conflict between parents leave their mark on children and can damage their life 
chances. While we will always uphold the institution of marriage, it cannot be right that our 
outdated law creates or increases conflict between divorcing couples.”69  
Could religion provide a basis for upholding the current law, under article 9 ECHR, 
which provides for the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion? Again, the lack 
of any one accepted or protected religion makes it harder to uphold individual beliefs 
predicated on different religions. The ECtHR has demonstrated its willingness to protect 
                                                          
67 Trinder et al, Finding Fault?, 54. 
68 See the comment from Gaby Hinsliff, “It won’t undermine marriage to make divorce 
easier. It’s simple humanity.” The Guardian, 9 April 2019. 
69 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-divorce-law-to-end-the-blame-game (accessed 
9 April 2019). Aidan Jones, Chief Executive at Relate, echoed these concerns in the same 
press release. 
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spouses in the face of specific religious beliefs where necessary, as for example in relation to 
the Jewish get, without which a Jewish woman cannot remarry.70 Critically, while some 
religions may be opposed to divorce in principle, that is not the question at issue here: given 
that the UK does permit divorce, it is not clear what religious belief would require disclosure 
of private information to lie at the heart of divorce law. Accordingly, state-sanctioned 
disclosure is unlikely to be protected on religious grounds, even if the wider issue of access to 
divorce is challenged.   
Arguably, the debate as to whether our current divorce law can be justified as 
necessary in a democratic society or on religious grounds, has largely been answered by the 
Government’s April 2019 announcement of plans to introduce no fault divorce in England 
and Wales. The new process outlined in the press release emphasises the scope for a 
consensual approach by allowing for a joint application and also includes the removal of any 
right to oppose a divorce petition.71 The need for divorce law in the UK to apportion blame or 
find fault and, with it, to disclose highly personal information, has been squarely overcome 
by this announcement.  
On all these grounds, therefore, it is clear that the disclosure of private information in 
order to obtain a divorce cannot be justified by reference to health or morals, or the rights and 
freedoms of the other spouse. Divorce can be facilitated without the need for such invasive 
requirements, and there is no justification for the ongoing statutory invasion of privacy: it is 
not necessary in a democratic society. This is particularly the case when the importance of the 
individual’s legal status is taken into account.  
 
 
 
(4) Change of Status: Form not Function 
The purpose of divorce is to enable both parties to change their legal status from married to 
single. Likewise, the purpose of marriage is to change status from single to married. This 
change of status is fundamental in a number of contexts: immigration; succession; tax; and, 
of course, the right to re-marry. Moreover, it is fundamental in and of itself: should a person 
be entitled to a legal status which reflects their true self? By putting an obstacle (the 
                                                          
70 D v France, Application No. 10180/82. Similar protection is now found in the Divorce 
(Scotland) Act 1976, section 3A. 
71 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-divorce-law-to-end-the-blame-game (accessed 
9 April 2019). 
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requirement to disclose personal and intimate information) in the way of this change of status 
the state is obstructing the fundamental right of individuals to change their status. More 
accurately, since denying divorce does not necessarily save the marriage,72 any obstructions 
are in fact forcing individuals to live with a misleading and inaccurate status, of being 
married while not being in a functioning marriage. The consequences of living with a false 
status are serious and wide-ranging, extending from the very practical financial harms that 
can result if a (long-separated) spouse is nonetheless entitled to claim in succession, to the 
core principles of personal identity, autonomy and truth.  
Marital status is a matter of form, not function: once a couple goes through a marriage 
ceremony and sign the register, they are legally married, regardless of whether they function 
as a married couple thereafter.73 There is no minimum standard of conduct or “function” 
which is required either to become married or to maintain the marriage thereafter.74 Likewise, 
divorce hinges entirely on satisfying the formal requirements of the statutory test of 
irretrievable breakdown of the marriage: it cannot be achieved by demonstrating a lack of 
functionality.75 Since marriage and divorce – and therefore legal status – turn on form, the 
form taken to acquire or lose that status is critical. The law should not unnecessarily hinder 
individuals from changing their status. Yet current divorce law presents couples with an 
invidious choice: living with an inaccurate status, and all the legal and social consequences 
that flow therefrom, or securing the correct status through the state-mandated disclosure of 
intimate and (possibly deeply upsetting) personal information. 
 Thus, the need to respect and facilitate the correct legal status for the individual, 
coupled with the lack of a compelling argument to require disclosure to uphold the rights and 
freedoms of their spouse, combine to suggest that the current framing of divorce law is not 
necessary in a democratic society. Can any other defences be advanced to protect the current 
statutory regimes? 
 
(5)  The margin of appreciation 
                                                          
72 Jonathan Herring, Rebecca Probert, Stephen Gilmore, Great Debates in Family Law, 2nd ed 
(Palgrave, 2015), 195; Trinder et al, Finding Fault?, 96. 
73 See the comments on the nature of marriage by Sir James Munby in In the matter of X (A 
Child) [2018] EWFC 15, paras 6-8. 
74 For example, non-consummation through wilful refusal is not (and never has been) a 
ground for rendering a marriage void or voidable: consensus non concubitus facit 
matrimonium. There is no minimum component of marriage.  
75 As markedly demonstrated in Owens v Owens [2018] UKSC 41. 
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Every state has the benefit of a margin of appreciation – a “space for manoeuvre”76 – when 
fulfilling its ECHR obligations. This reflects the fact that the ECHR is seen as the lowest 
common denominator.77 The extent of the margin is typically influenced by trends and 
majority views across Europe and, typically, convergence between states comes over time: 
the increasing acceptance of same sex marriage across Europe over the last two decades 
being a good example. Would the margin of appreciation justify a privacy-infringing divorce 
law in Scotland or England and Wales? In interpreting article 8, it is important to recognise 
that a distinct right to divorce is not a right protected by the ECHR.78 Any right to divorce is 
therefore a matter for the individual state. Nonetheless, as with any provision, the right 
should be upheld by the state in accordance with the Convention principles. Thus, where 
divorce is recognised, it should be facilitated by the state in accordance with the ECHR, 
including the right to private life. Moreover, the decision of the ECtHR in Johnston v Ireland, 
which determined there was no Convention right to divorce in terms of article 8 or article 12, 
is now over 30 years old. There is no guarantee that the ECtHR would reach the same 
conclusion today, particularly in light of changing social norms throughout the Council of 
Europe states, whereby all states now recognise a right to divorce (which was emphatically 
not the case when Johnston v Ireland was decided).79  
This greater cohesion across Europe also addresses the potential defence for the state 
by pointing to its margin of appreciation. With more European states – including our nearest 
neighbours in England and Wales – moving towards divorce by consent or on demand, then 
the margin for maintaining intrusive notions of blame and fault will continue to shrink. 
Accordingly, the right to end a marriage in as constructive and non-invasive a manner as 
possible may in future be seen as part of the article 8 canon of rights to respect for private and 
family life.  
 
 
(6) The Privacy of Third Parties 
A final argument to demonstrate why existing divorce law is not article 8 compliant can be 
found in the potential for collateral damage. Current law may, in some cases, require 
                                                          
76 Council of Europe, “The margin of appreciation” published online at 
https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/lisbonnetwork/themis/echr/paper2_en.asp  
77 Council of Europe, “The margin of appreciation” published online at 
https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/lisbonnetwork/themis/echr/paper2_en.asp 
78 Johnston v Ireland (1986) 9 EHRR 203. 
80 Campbell v MGN [2004] UKHL 22; Ferdinand v MGN Ltd [2011] EWHC 2454 (QB). 
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disclosure of personal information in relation to third parties: children, a paramour, or other 
individuals caught up in the breakdown of the marriage. Where these parties have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, the infringement of their privacy in a divorce action cannot 
be justified by pointing to the legal end achieved, since there is no change in status for them 
as a result of the divorce.  
 
(7) Article 10 – Freedom of expression 
It is of course a defence to an invasion of privacy to demonstrate that the person disclosing is 
exercising his/her right to freedom of expression. Yet this again is defeated by the fact that 
disclosure to the state, to obtain a divorce, can be achieved without such disclosure: there is 
no need for the parties to “express” themselves in this way. If there is an alternative, non-
infringing, way to achieve the same end, then it is suggested that there can be no claim in 
freedom of expression at least for the purposes of the litigation in hand, or the exercise of 
legal rights. There may of course be a separate right under article 10 to proclaim the 
infidelity from the roof tops, or to broadcast the behaviour and the impossibility of living 
with the spouse on social media, for example – typically to correct a lie.80 But for the 
purposes of divorce, it is difficult to see that requiring spouses to disclose intimate and 
private information to the state in order to obtain a divorce is in fact justified on the grounds 
of enabling them to exercise their article 10 right to freedom of expression. 
 
(8) Article 8: Conclusion  
My primary argument therefore is this:  where the law could achieve the aim of granting 
divorce in another way, which does not infringe privacy, then it would need a cogent 
justification for continuing to pursue that aim in a non-compliant manner. Why should parties 
be required to disclose highly personal information – in breach of article 8 privacy rights – to 
secure a divorce? This section has demonstrated that there is no clear basis on which the 
invasion of privacy that occurs in every divorce action is justified as being “necessary in a 
democratic society”, nor can it be justified on grounds of freedom of expression. As other 
jurisdictions have shown, divorce can be achieved without the need to place before the state 
evidence of adultery, behaviour or non-cohabitation. And although the right to divorce is not 
in itself a recognised Convention right, divorce is inherently tied to state recognition of the 
spouses’ legal status. Failure to facilitate divorce leads to individuals being confined to their 
                                                          
80 Campbell v MGN [2004] UKHL 22; Ferdinand v MGN Ltd [2011] EWHC 2454 (QB). 
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married status, and all that that entails, despite this no longer reflecting the truth of their lives. 
The invasion is compounded in cases which involve disclosure concerning third parties. 
Current divorce law in Scotland thus breaches individuals’ rights to privacy in terms of article 
8.  
 
 
E. PROPOSED LAW REFORM 
While the parties, solicitors and judiciary can take steps to minimise the invasion of privacy 
under current law, by limiting the details disclosed, the only rigorous solution is statutory 
reform. What should such a reformed law look like? The most critical aspect would be to 
introduce a model which moves away from the need to establish any “irretrievable 
breakdown” of the marriage, with its consequent need for invasive evidence, and instead 
focus on respecting the wishes of the parties themselves.81 While the courts would still be 
involved, the process and outcome would be primarily administrative in nature, with no scope 
or need for the judge to hear evidence to establish any breakdown of the marriage.  
Divorce laws which meet these criteria can be found in other jurisdictions, from the 
Commission on European Family Law Principles, and from the Finding Fault? report. After 
surveying the divorce provisions in 22 European jurisdictions, CEFL produced a model 
divorce law.82 This proposed two routes to divorce: mutual consent, and divorce without 
consent.83 Where both spouses consent, no period of separation would be required, but a 
period of reflection would be mandatory where there are children under 16,84 or where the 
parties have not reached agreement on all consequences of the divorce.85 However, these 
periods of reflection would not apply where the parties have already been separated for 6 
months.86 In cases where there is not mutual consent to the divorce, then a divorce shall be 
                                                          
81 The new English proposals appear to intend to keep “irretrievable breakdown” as the basis 
for divorce: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-divorce-law-to-end-the-blame-game 
(accessed 9 April 2019) How it will work in practice remains to be seen. 
82 http://ceflonline.net/wp-content/uploads/Principles-English.pdf . 
83 In either case, no minimum period of marriage is required: Principle 1:1(2). 
84 Where there are children under 16, there must be a period of reflection of 3 months where 
the parties have agreed all the consequences of the divorce; or 6 months if they have not 
reached such agreement: Principle 1:5(1). 
85 Principle 1:5(2). 
86 Principle 1:5(3). 
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granted where the parties have been separated for a year.87 There is scope for one party to 
petition for a divorce before then “in cases of exceptional hardship”.88 
This is similar to the approach in Sweden, which introduced a straightforward no fault 
divorce procedure in 1973.89 Spouses can now seek in immediate divorce if they both agree 
to the divorce and do not have children under 16. In other cases – where there are children 
under 16, where one party does not agree, or where either party requests it – there will be a 
reconsideration period of 6 months, after which the divorce will be granted.90 If the parties 
have lived apart for at least two years, they can seek an immediate divorce.91 
No fault divorce based on a notification process was also the final option canvassed in 
Finding Fault?. Although the authors do not advance a detailed proposal of the shape of such 
a model, the evidence from their empirical research supports a no fault regime, with some 
element of a cooling off period of between 6 and 12 months.92 
A two-step process has much to offer, by introducing a clear administrative 
procedure, and including a break period between the application and the award. A revised 
procedure in Scotland could therefore provide for one spouse to lodge a Notice of Intention to 
Divorce (NID). After a specified period (whether termed a cooling off period, or reflection 
period, or similar), the spouse could then apply for a decree of divorce, with reference to the 
earlier NID. In that period, the parties would remain married, and the person who lodged the 
NID could withdraw it, if so wished. However, if the spouse who lodged the NID did proceed 
to apply for a decree, there would be no judicial power to refuse decree, to request any 
evidence, or to scrutinise the reasons for seeking divorce. The key point is that, both at the 
point of lodging the NID and subsequently applying for decree of divorce, the spouse should 
be able to “demand” it. There should be no need to prove that the marriage has irretrievably 
broken down, or to establish that one party was at fault – and no need for any judicial enquiry 
or evidence of any conduct.  
                                                          
87 Principle 1:8. 
88 Principle 1:9. 
89 Maarit Jantera-Jareborg, “Grounds for Divorce and Maintenance between Former Spouses 
in Sweden”, CEFL Country Report (2002) available at: http://ceflonline.net/wp-
content/uploads/Sweden-Divorce.pdf , at 3. 
90 Marriage Code of 1987, Chapter 5, sections 1 and 2; Maarit Jantera-Jareborg, “Grounds for 
Divorce and Maintenance between Former Spouses in Sweden”, CEFL Country Report 
(2002) available at: http://ceflonline.net/wp-content/uploads/Sweden-Divorce.pdf , at 4.  
91 Marriage Code of 1987, Chapter 5, section 4; Maarit Jantera-Jareborg, “Grounds for 
Divorce and Maintenance between Former Spouses in Sweden”, CEFL Country Report 
(2002) available at: http://ceflonline.net/wp-content/uploads/Sweden-Divorce.pdf , at 4. 
92 Trinder et al, Finding Fault?, para 12.5 and table 12.3. 
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In view of the need to ensure both parties have adequate time to address financial 
provision (especially in the absence of meaningful welfare state provision), and to protect 
either party from being bullied into the divorce with undue haste, it is proposed that the 
period between the NID and the application should be 12 months. This deliberately rejects 
the shorter time frames for divorce on demand seen in Sweden and proposed by the CEFL 
project. As reflected in experience in Scotland, and particularly the heavy use of the one and 
two years’ non-cohabitation grounds, rushing through divorce in less than a year seems to 
neglect the need for spouses to take time to consider their financial position, and does not 
reflect the reality of this process of negotiation, in Scotland at least.  
Such a system would also need to provide for a long-stop date. This would mean that 
the holder of the NID would need to apply for decree of divorce before a certain deadline, 
otherwise the NID would lapse. This would ensure that pragmatic spouses could not lodge a 
NID simply to hold in readiness against a far-off day when they may well wish to seek a 
divorce at short notice.  
One consequence of an administrative process, which has a built-in minimum period 
of one year before the decree could be granted, is that there would be no possibility of ending 
a marriage in a shorter period. This may be of particular concern in cases of domestic abuse 
or any other criminal conduct by one spouse. Thus, in introducing a no-fault divorce 
procedure, to facilitate divorce which respects the spouses’ article 8 rights, very serious 
consideration would need to be given to the need to protect spouses from harm. An additional 
legal procedure may be appropriate to allow the court to grant a divorce in cases of domestic 
abuse or upon the conviction of one spouse for a criminal offence. While the precise scope of 
a reformed divorce law remains to be determined, based on consultation and debate, it 
remains clear that it is possible to form a system which facilitates divorce without breaching 
the article 8 rights of the spouses or any other connected parties.  
 
F. CONCLUSION 
[M]ost countries in Europe are still reluctant to recognise a simple, autonomous 
decision by spouses to end their marriage as a sufficient ground for divorce. In one 
way or another, the state continues to seek to protect spouses from their own ‘ill-
considered’ decisions.93 
                                                          
93 Masha Antokolskaia, “Divorce law in a European Perspective”, in Jens M Scherpe (Ed) 
European Family Law Vol III (E Elgar 2016), at 71. 
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While arguments in favour of divorce on demand or no fault divorce can be made at length, 
and compellingly,94 this article has sought to show that current divorce law is in urgent need 
of reform for a different reason: it breaches the spouses’ article 8 right to privacy. The current 
statutory requirement of demonstrating irretrievable breakdown threatens spouses’ autonomy 
and dignity, by requiring them to choose between disclosing deeply personal and privacy 
information in court, or retaining a status which does not reflect the truth of their lives. There 
can be no justification for this ongoing state-mandated invasion of privacy when the outcome 
can be achieved through non-infringing means. As other European jurisdictions show, an 
administrative divorce based on the simple request of one party, with some cooling off 
period, can allow spouses to exit an unhappy marriage with the minimum acrimony and 
conflict, while still protecting their wider interests. It is to be hoped that law reform can 
ensure that Scotland meets its obligations under the ECHR and, in doing so, respects the 
privacy and autonomy of its citizens.  
                                                          
94 Trinder et al, Finding Fault?. 
